Privacy Features

Deep dive into the privacy protections built into Nothing Private Browser.

Overview

Nothing Private Browser has zero telemetry, zero session persistence, and zero black boxes. Every privacy feature is enabled by default — no configuration required.

Feature	Status	Description
Zero telemetry	✅ Enabled	No analytics, no phoning home
Session wiping	✅ Enabled	Everything deleted on close
Fingerprint spoofing	✅ Enabled	Chrome-identical fingerprint
WebRTC leak protection	✅ Enabled	Real IP never exposed
UA-CH spoofing	✅ Enabled	Modern fingerprinting blocked
Ad blocking	📋 Planned	Network-level filter lists
Tor routing	📋 Planned	Optional onion routing
VPN integration	📋 Planned	Import .ovpn/WireGuard

Zero Telemetry

Nothing Private Browser sends zero data anywhere.

What's Not Collected

cpp

// NOTHING is collected:
// ❌ No usage metrics
// ❌ No crash reports
// ❌ No browsing history
// ❌ No search queries
// ❌ No device information
// ❌ No IP addresses
// ❌ No timestamps
// ❌ Nothing

No "Phone Home" Calls

cpp

// No calls to:
// • google-analytics.com
// • crashlytics.com
// • sentry.io
// • Any external servers

// The browser only connects to sites YOU visit

Comparison

Browser	Telemetry	Phone Home
Nothing Private	❌ None	❌ None
Chrome	✅ Yes	✅ Yes
Firefox	⚠️ Some	⚠️ Some
Brave	⚠️ Some	⚠️ Some
Safari	⚠️ Some	✅ Yes

Zero Session Persistence

Everything is wiped when you close the browser.

What Gets Wiped

Item	Status	On Close
Cookies	✅ Deleted	Immediately
Cache	✅ Cleared	Immediately
localStorage	✅ Emptied	Immediately
sessionStorage	✅ Emptied	Immediately
Browsing history	✅ Removed	Immediately
IndexedDB	✅ Purged	Immediately
Service workers	✅ Unregistered	Immediately
Site permissions	✅ Reset	Immediately

Code Implementation

cpp

void PrivateBrowser::closeEvent(QCloseEvent* event) {
    // Wipe everything
    m_profile->cookieStore()->deleteAllCookies();
    m_profile->clearHttpCache();
    m_profile->clearAllVisitedLinks();
    m_profile->clearStorage();
    
    // Delete storage files
    QString storagePath = m_profile->storagePath();
    if (QDir(storagePath).exists()) {
        QDir(storagePath).removeRecursively();
    }
    
    // Fresh profile next launch
    m_profile = new QWebEngineProfile("PrivateSession_" + QUuid::createUuid().toString());
}

What This Means

Close the browser = fresh start
No traces on disk
No way to recover previous session
Perfect for sensitive browsing

Fingerprint Spoofing

Nothing Private Browser randomizes browser fingerprints to prevent tracking.

Spoofed Properties

Property	Real Value	Spoofed Value
User-Agent	Firefox/Chrome version	Chrome 124
Platform	Linux x86_64	Win32
Hardware concurrency	16 cores	8 cores
Device memory	32GB	8GB
WebGL vendor	NVIDIA/AMD	Intel Inc.
WebGL renderer	Actual GPU	Intel Iris
Canvas fingerprint	Unique	Noised (xorshift)
Audio fingerprint	Unique	Noised (±0.00000005)

Injection Timing

Spoofing happens at DocumentCreation — before any page JavaScript runs:

cpp

QWebEngineScript script;
script.setInjectionPoint(QWebEngineScript::DocumentCreation);  // Key!
script.setWorldId(QWebEngineScript::MainWorld);
script.setRunsOnSubFrames(true);

This means page scripts cannot detect the spoofing — it was "always there."

Per-Session Randomization

cpp

// New seeds every session
m_canvasSeed = QRandomGenerator::global()->generateDouble();
m_audioSeed = QRandomGenerator::global()->generateDouble();

// Different fingerprint every session
// Consistent within the same session

WebRTC Leak Protection

WebRTC can expose your real IP address even when using a VPN.

The Problem

javascript

// Any website can do this
const pc = new RTCPeerConnection({ iceServers: [{ urls: "stun:stun.l.google.com:19302" }] });
pc.createDataChannel("");
pc.createOffer().then(offer => pc.setLocalDescription(offer));

// Your real IP appears in ICE candidates
pc.onicecandidate = (event) => {
    console.log(event.candidate.candidate); // Real IP exposed!
};

The Solution

cpp

void WebRTCProtector::interceptRTCPeerConnection() {
    // Strip all STUN servers from ICE config
    QString script = R"(
        const OriginalRTCPeerConnection = window.RTCPeerConnection;
        window.RTCPeerConnection = function(config) {
            // Remove STUN servers
            if (config && config.iceServers) {
                config.iceServers = config.iceServers.filter(
                    server => !server.urls?.includes('stun:')
                );
            }
            return new OriginalRTCPeerConnection(config);
        };
    )";
    
    m_page->runJavaScript(script);
}

Result

Scenario	Real IP Leaks?
Without protection	✅ Yes (exposed)
With protection	❌ No (blocked)
With VPN + protection	❌ No (VPN IP only)

UA-CH Spoofing

User-Agent Client Hints (UA-CH) are modern fingerprinting methods.

What UA-CH Reveals

javascript

// Sites can request high-entropy values
const hints = await navigator.userAgentData.getHighEntropyValues([
    "architecture",
    "model",
    "platform",
    "platformVersion",
    "uaFullVersion"
]);

// Without spoofing, reveals:
// • CPU architecture (arm64/x86)
// • Device model (MacBookPro18,1)
// • Exact OS version
// • Exact browser version

Spoofed Values

cpp

QString spoofedUA = R"(
    Object.defineProperty(navigator, 'userAgentData', {
        get: () => ({
            brands: [
                { brand: "Chromium", version: "124" },
                { brand: "Not A(Brand", version: "99" }
            ],
            mobile: false,
            platform: "Windows",
            getHighEntropyValues: async (hints) => ({
                architecture: "x86",
                model: "",
                platform: "Windows",
                platformVersion: "10.0",
                uaFullVersion: "124.0.6367.91"
            })
        })
    });
)";

DNS Leak Prevention

DNS leaks can reveal your browsing activity even with HTTPS.

Current Status

Feature	Status	Version
DNS over HTTPS	⚠️ Planned	v0.2.0
DNS leak blocking	⚠️ Planned	v0.2.0
Custom DNS servers	⚠️ Planned	v0.2.0

Workaround

Use a VPN or configure system DNS:

bash

# Linux - use Cloudflare DNS
echo "nameserver 1.1.1.1" | sudo tee /etc/resolv.conf
echo "nameserver 1.0.0.1" | sudo tee -a /etc/resolv.conf

Ad Blocking (Planned for v0.2.0)

Network-level ad blocking using filter lists.

List	Status
EasyList	📋 Planned
EasyPrivacy	📋 Planned
Peter Lowe's list	📋 Planned
uBlock Origin filters	📋 Planned

Implementation

cpp

class AdBlocker : public QWebEngineUrlRequestInterceptor {
    void interceptRequest(QWebEngineUrlRequestInfo &info) override {
        QUrl url = info.requestUrl();
        
        // Check against filter lists
        if (m_filterList->isBlocked(url.host(), url.path())) {
            info.block(true);
            return;
        }
        
        info.block(false);
    }
};

Tor Routing (Planned for v0.3.0)

Optional onion routing for complete anonymity.

How It Works

Your Computer → Tor Network → Destination
                    │
                    ├── Node 1 (entry)
                    ├── Node 2 (middle)
                    └── Node 3 (exit) → Website

Implementation

cpp

void enableTor() {
    // Route through Tor SOCKS proxy
    m_profile->setProxy(QNetworkProxy::Socks5Proxy, "127.0.0.1", 9050);
    
    // Disable WebRTC (already done)
    // Disable DNS leaks
    // Disable JavaScript if needed
}

One Toggle

cpp

// Settings toggle
connect(torToggle, &QCheckBox::toggled, [this](bool enabled) {
    if (enabled) {
        enableTor();
    } else {
        disableTor();
    }
});

VPN Integration (Planned for v0.3.0)

Import VPN configurations directly into the browser.

Supported Formats

Format	Support
OpenVPN (.ovpn)	📋 Planned
WireGuard (.conf)	📋 Planned
ProtonVPN	📋 Planned

Import Flow

cpp

void importVPNConfig(const QString& filePath) {
    if (filePath.endsWith(".ovpn")) {
        importOpenVPN(filePath);
    } else if (filePath.endsWith(".conf")) {
        importWireGuard(filePath);
    }
    
    // Route browser traffic through VPN
    m_profile->setProxy(m_vpnProxy);
}

Privacy Settings (None)

There are no privacy settings to configure.

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    SETTINGS                                 │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                             │
│   There is nothing to configure.                            │
│                                                             │
│   Privacy is already enabled.                               │
│   Fingerprinting is already blocked.                        │
│   WebRTC is already protected.                              │
│                                                             │
│   Close the browser when you're done.                       │
│   Everything is wiped automatically.                        │
│                                                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Privacy by default. No toggles. No confusion.

Privacy Audit Checklist

Check	Status	Evidence
No telemetry	✅ Pass	Code audit, network monitoring
No persistent storage	✅ Pass	Storage cleared on close
Fingerprint spoofing	✅ Pass	JA3 matches Chrome
WebRTC protection	✅ Pass	STUN servers stripped
UA-CH spoofing	✅ Pass	getHighEntropyValues spoofed
DNS leaks	⚠️ Partial	VPN required
Ad blocking	📋 Planned	v0.2.0
Tor integration	📋 Planned	v0.3.0

Testing Your Privacy

Test Your Browser

Site	What It Tests
browserleaks.com	WebRTC, canvas, fingerprints
amiunique.org	Browser fingerprint
ipleak.net	IP and DNS leaks
deviceinfo.me	Device information

Manual Tests

javascript

// Check WebRTC leak
const pc = new RTCPeerConnection({ iceServers: [{ urls: "stun:stun.l.google.com:19302" }] });
pc.createDataChannel("");
pc.createOffer().then(offer => pc.setLocalDescription(offer));
pc.onicecandidate = (event) => {
    console.log(event.candidate?.candidate); // Should be empty or no IP
};

// Check fingerprint
console.log(navigator.userAgent);
console.log(navigator.plugins.length);
console.log(navigator.webdriver); // Should be undefined

Next Steps

Installation — Install the browser
Roadmap — Upcoming privacy features
Limitations — Known limitations

Nothing Ecosystem · Ernest Tech House · Kenya · 2026

Privacy Features ​

Overview ​

Zero Telemetry ​

What's Not Collected ​

No "Phone Home" Calls ​

Comparison ​

Zero Session Persistence ​

What Gets Wiped ​

Code Implementation ​

What This Means ​

Fingerprint Spoofing ​

Spoofed Properties ​

Injection Timing ​

Per-Session Randomization ​

WebRTC Leak Protection ​

The Problem ​

The Solution ​

Result ​

UA-CH Spoofing ​

What UA-CH Reveals ​

Spoofed Values ​

DNS Leak Prevention ​

Current Status ​

Workaround ​

Ad Blocking (Planned for v0.2.0) ​

Filter List Support ​

Implementation ​

Tor Routing (Planned for v0.3.0) ​

How It Works ​

Implementation ​

One Toggle ​

VPN Integration (Planned for v0.3.0) ​

Supported Formats ​

Import Flow ​

Privacy Settings (None) ​

Privacy Audit Checklist ​

Testing Your Privacy ​

Test Your Browser ​

Manual Tests ​

Next Steps ​

Privacy Features

Overview

Zero Telemetry

What's Not Collected

No "Phone Home" Calls

Comparison

Zero Session Persistence

What Gets Wiped

Code Implementation

What This Means

Fingerprint Spoofing

Spoofed Properties

Injection Timing

Per-Session Randomization

WebRTC Leak Protection

The Problem

The Solution

Result

UA-CH Spoofing

What UA-CH Reveals

Spoofed Values

DNS Leak Prevention

Current Status

Workaround

Ad Blocking (Planned for v0.2.0)

Filter List Support

Implementation

Tor Routing (Planned for v0.3.0)

How It Works

Implementation

One Toggle

VPN Integration (Planned for v0.3.0)

Supported Formats

Import Flow

Privacy Settings (None)

Privacy Audit Checklist

Testing Your Privacy

Test Your Browser

Manual Tests

Next Steps